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FDA DISCLOSURE OF SAFETY AND
EFFECTIVENESS DATA: A LEGAL AND
POLICY ANALYSIS
A matter of great dispute between the pharmaceutical industry
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the agency's public
information policy. In response to the requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),I the FDA in 1974 published extensive regula-
tions2 outlining which material in its files would be subject to public
disclosure. Those regulations greatly changed the agency's disclosure
policy. Before they were issued, the FDA granted only about ten per-
cent of the FOIA requests it received;3 after they became effective over
ninety-eight percent of such requests were approved.4 Undoubtedly, a
large percentage of the increase in successful requests was due to the
clarity and detail of the regulations. Nevertheless, the new procedure
signified a major change by the FDA which it labeled a "new policy of
open disclosure. ''5
One major area affected by the regulations is the treatment of
safety and effectiveness test data that must be submitted with a new
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
Clement, The Right of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Infor-
mation: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L. REV. 587 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Clement];
F. Dworkin, Impact of Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data on Expenditures for Pharma-
ceutical Research and Development (Apr. 1978) (unpublished manuscript, Office of Planning and
Evaluation, Food and Drug Administration) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin];
Pracon Incorporated, Study to Assess Impact of Releasing Safety and Effectiveness Data on
the Pharmaceutical Industry's Incentives to Invest in and Conduct Research and Development
Programs (Jan. 1978) (unpublished study submitted to Office of Planning and Evaluation, Food
and Drug Administration) [hereinafter cited as Pracon Study];
REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION AND WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT. AN EVALUATION OF FDA's TRADE SECRETS AND FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION POLICIES (Nov. 15, 1976), published in I INTERIM REPORTS, REVIEW
PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
2. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 21 C.F.R. (1978)).
3. See O'Keefe, The FDA's Freedom ofInformation Act Regulations, 30 FOOD, DRUG &
CosM. L.J. 312, 313 (1975).
4. Brandenburg, Information Requests Under the F01Act, 30 FOOD, DRUG & CosM. L.J.
321, 323 (1975).
5. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602 (1974).
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drug application (NDA).6 The FDA recognizes the proprietary interest
of the submitting firm in the data,' and the regulations provide that
such information is not subject to release.' But, because of the need to
inform the public of the basis for the FDA's approval of a particular
NDA, the regulations permit the release of summaries of the data after
the granting of an NDA.9 -
This disposition of the question of confidentiality of safety and ef-
fectiveness data has not ended the debate. The FDA has professed a
desire to release all safety and effectiveness data in NDAs, rather than
mere summaries,' 0 but insists that such disclosure is prohibited by the
trade secrets provisions of the federal criminal code' and the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. 2 Industry, on the other hand, would restrict
access to the data in an effort to protect the return on its investment in
research and development.' 3 As a result of the ongoing debate and
because of the feeling that such a substantive matter should be resolved
by the legislative branch, the status of safety and effectiveness data has
become a major concern of the proposed Drug Regulation Reform
Act.14
This Comment will address both the legal and policy issues in the
debate. It will be seen that the FDA's conclusion that it lacks the au-
thority to release the safety and effectiveness data without new legisla-
tion is uncertain. This is not to say, however, that full disclosure of this
data would be sound on policy grounds. In fact, the disclosure rules
included in the proposed legislation are undesirable because of the like-
lihood of detrimental effects on research and development and the
problem of drug lag. The Comment will propose an alternative scheme
of disclosure policy that should accomplish the goals of full disclo-
sure-opening up FDA decision making and reducing expensive du-
plicative testing-without the costs inherent in complete release of the
data.
6. 21 C.F.R. § 314.14 (1978).
7. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612 (1974). The preamble to the regulations states that the
agency "agrees that there is a property right" in trade secrets and that the nondisclosure provisions
of the regulations adequately reflect that right.
8. Id.
9. 21 C.F.R. § 314.14(e)(2) (1978). If the existence of the NDA had been publicly acknowl-
edged by the submitter, the agency could release summaries of selected portions prior to a final
decision by the FDA on whether to allow marketing of the drug. Id. § 314.14(d) (1978).
10. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,634, 44,642 (1974); see INTERIM REPORT 18-19.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1976).
13. See, e.g., Pendergast, Evolving Approaches to the Regulation of Prescrollon Drugs, 31
FoOD, DRUG & CosM. L. 521, 526-27 (1976).
14. S. 2755 and H.R. 11611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE LICENSING PROCEDURE FOR NEW DRUGS
Safety and effectiveness data form an essential part of the drug
licensing procedure. The 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act'" provide that no new drug can be marketed in the ab-
sence of proof to the FDA, through test data, that the substance is both
safe and effective for its intended uses.16 The level of proof required by
the statute is "substantial evidence," which is defined as "evidence con-
sisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations ... on the basis
of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded. . . that the drug
will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the con-
ditions of use prescribed."' 7
This evidence is not quickly or easily developed. The process of
new drug development typically begins with the screening of several
chemical compounds in laboratory animals for therapeutic benefits.' 8
At this point, the experimenting firm selects the most promising com-
pounds and tests various dosage levels. If the new drug is patentable
(the degree of novelty that triggers the necessity for an NDA is lower
than that required to establish a patent"), patent applications for the
most promising and related compounds are usually filed at this stage.
This is done to ensure that the firm does not invest many years and tens
of millions of dollars in the development of a new drug only to have its
effort preempted by another firm's patent.
Early patenting benefits all researching firms by providing notice
of competitors' efforts and allowing for the avoidance of much waste-
ful, duplicative testing, thereby encouraging efficient allocation of the
15. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976).
16. Id. § 355(a).
17. Id. § 355(d).
18. REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, FINAL REPORT 19 (1977). See also Pines, A Primer on New Drug Development, FDA
CONSUMER, Feb. 1974, at 12.
19. The definition of a "new drug" is found at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1976):
(1) Any drug... the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof....
(2) Any drug... the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of
investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use under such conditions, has
become so recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such investigations, been
used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions.
The key in determining the need for an NDA, therefore, is whether the compound is generally
recognized as safe and effective under the proposed conditions; not, as it is for the purpose of a
patent, whether the compound is novel. J. MAsHAw & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIALS 463 (1975). The patent requirement of
"non-obviousness" makes specific dosage forms, compounds discussed in published scientific liter-
ature and those found in nature not patentable. INTERIM REPORT 30.
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limited resources available for drug research.20 Although there are no
statistics on the percentage of recently granted or pending NDAs that
are patented, the FDA has indicated that the percentage is quite high.21
Between 1962 and 1975 only 29.7% of all new drug sales were of non-
patented drugs.22 Some of those sales undoubtedly consisted of pat-
ented drugs whose patent had expired. Thus, it seems fair to conclude
that the great majority of new drugs, and certainly the most important,
are patented.
Before human testing of a new drug can begin, the developer must
file with the FDA a "Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for
a New Drug" (IND). In this document the developer must disclose the
composition of the new drug, its manufacturing formula, the results of
all animal tests relating to the drug's therapeutic promise and a detailed
description of the proposed human testing (the protocol).23 If the FDA
does not contest the IND within 30 days, it becomes effective and
human testing can begin.24
The testing of experimental drugs on human subjects is carried out
in three stages. In Phase I the drug is given to a small number of vol-
untary healthy subjects, usually less than ten, to determine whether the
drug is reasonably safe for human use and to ascertain the appropriate
dosage level and form. After this is completed, the human testing en-
ters Phase II, which consists of trials on a larger, but still very limited,
population aimed at determining the effectiveness of the drug. If these
results are satisfactory, the drug will enter the final and most extensive
stage of testing. Phase III consists of large-scale, carefully controlled
clinical trials. Hundreds of patients are usually involved in this final
effort to assess the safety, effectiveness and preferred dosage of the new
drug.25
When all of the testing has been completed, the developer submits
the test data to the FDA. This information, combined with that in the
IND, is the NDA, which often consists of thousands of pages. The
FDA is required by statute to act on an NDA within 180 days. 6 In
practice, however, this rarely occurs. In most cases, the agency and
20. See Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977).
21. INTERIM REPORT 30 n.98.
22. Dworkin 6. The term "new drugs" is defined as all single chemical entities, synthesized
drugs, salts and esters introduced in the United States for the first time in the period under study,
1962-1975. Id.
23. 21 C.F.R. § 312 (1978); Pines, supra note 18, at 12.
24. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1978).
25. FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 20; Pines, supra note 18, at 12-14.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1976).
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firm either agree to an extension of time (as permitted by statute27), or
the FDA declares the NDA incomplete and seeks additional informa-
tion.2
II. PRESENT TREATMENT OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA
The FDA's disclosure policy regarding safety and effectiveness
data has undergone great evolution. Prior to the enactment of the
Freedom of Information Act,29 the agency viewed all data in an NDA
as strictly confidential.3 0 It was not until 1972, six years after the enact-
ment of the FOIA heralded the new era of open disclosure, that the
FDA attempted in proposed regulations to delineate what constituted a
trade secret in an effort to clarify that exemption from the disclosure
requirements of the FOIA.3' The agency acted under these proposals
for two years, until the extensive "Public Information Regulations"
were issued in 1974.32
These regulations purport to release all of the safety and effective-
ness data that the law permits.33 A distinction is drawn between antibi-
otics and other human drugs. Since petitions to market antibiotics
result in publicly printed regulations rather than private licenses, 34 the
27. Id.
28. Pines, supra note 18, at 14.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
30. INTERIM REPORT 8.
31. 37 Fed. Reg. 9128 (1972).
32. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 21 C.F.R. (1978)). In particu-
lar, see 21 C.F.R. § 20 (1978) ("Public Information"), id. § 314.14 (1978) (NDAs) and id. § 431.71
(1978) (antibiotic drugs).
One sarcastic reviewer of FDA policy wrote:
The regulations, like the Savior, arrived in final form on Christmas Eve, when a new
babe of some 15 pages was born-preambled by 307 numbered paragraphs covering 40
pages, all swaddled in the Federal Register.
The new child, first proposed in May of 1972, was nurtured by almost 700 comment
letters sent to its father-the FDA, or PBH, or both--and gestated for 2 1/2 years in the
womb in Rockville.
While its final coming has been recent, the preamble informs us that the regulations
have been working miracles for over two years. And, indeed, the preamble provided 60
days for further comment on new matters and promised consideration of such comments
and possible changes yet to come. So, while the regulations are now final, they are not
quite final. But they are probably final enough. That is, unless you want to accept the
cordial invitation of the Commissioner to "institute legal action in the courts to contest
their validity" and, if successful, have them declared an abortion.
O'Keefe, supra note 3, at 313.
33. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,635 (1974).
The Commissioner agrees that public policy supports release of all safety and effective-
ness data, but points out that present statutory law, 18 U.S.C. [§] 1905 and 21 U.S.C. [§]
33 1(j), prohibits such release .... The Commissioner has no authority to institute such
a system [of release] without statutory authorization from Congress.
Id.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1976); 21 C.F.R. § 431 (1978).
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FDA concluded that safety and effectiveness data relating to antibiotics
could not be considered a trade secret or confidential commercial infor-
mation35 and is thus subject to release. Developers of new antibiotics
must therefore rely on patents to protect their research investment.
For all other new drugs intended for human use, permission to
market is given in the form of a private license. In view of the large
investment necessary to obtain such a license and the possibility of
competitive harm to the submitting firm resulting from the release of
safety and effectiveness data,36 the agency determined that such infor-
mation was entitled to protection. But that protection is not absolute.
If the applicant has made the information public, 37 or if the drug has
been disapproved, withdrawn from the market, found not to be "new,"
or the application abandoned, the safety and effectiveness data is sub-
ject to release "unless extraordinary circumstances are shown."38
Thus, safety and effectiveness data for approved and pending
NDAs is protected unless disclosed by the developer. However, the
FDA does recognize the public's need for information regarding the
basis of the agency's decision to allow marketing of a new drug. The
agency therefore releases summaries of the safety and effectiveness data
following approval of an NDA.39 For drugs approved after July 1,
1975, the summary may be compiled by the submitter or the agency.
The summary need not include the protocol for the study if it is distin-
guishable from other protocols and if its unique design gives the sub-
mitter a competitive advantage over other firms that are unaware of the
35. 21 C.F.R. § 431.71(e)(1) (1978); 39 Fed. Reg. 44,631-32 (1974). This reasoning is rejected
by one commentator who presumably feels that even the antibiotic test data can be misappropri-
ated to the competitive detriment of the developing company. Whyte, Drug Company Concerns
and Opportunites-How We Will Cope, 30 FOOD, DRUG & CosM. L.J. 338, 340 (1975).
36. Even if the drug is protected by a U.S. patent, a competitor could use the data to market
the drug in foreign countries where the original developer does not have a patent. In some coun-
tries, drugs are not patentable. The United States accounts for only about 18% of all world drug
sales, and this market share is declining. Therefore, release of safety and effectiveness data could
result in significant competitive harm to investment in research and development of the new drug,
regardless of whether the drug is protected by a U.S. patent. See Dworkin Attachment B, at 2.
37. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.81(a) (1978).
38. Id. § 314.14(f); see INTERIM REPORT 13-14. The preamble to the 1974 regulations offers
two examples of such "extraordinary circumstances." If a company is already marketing a drug
overseas and seeks an IND for marketing in this country, but the company later has that IND
terminated, the summary of data in the terminated IND could contain information that would
injure the submitter's position in the preexisting foreign market if made available to competitors.
If the company could show the likelihood of such damage in "concrete terms," the agency might
invoke the "extraordinary circumstances" exemption. Another situation where the agency might
not release otherwise disclosable summaries would be when such a release would directly harm
the competitive status of another, pending IND or NDA. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,633, 44,638
(1974).
39. 21 C.F.R. § 314.14(e)(2) (1978). See note 9 supra.
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particular test procedures.
It should be noted that even without new legislation, the FDA's
public information policy has continued to evolve. In the past, the
FDA has treated the very existence of an IND4 1 or an NDA42 as a
trade secret not subject to disclosure on the theory that the applicant
has a competitive interest in the maintenance of secrecy with respect to
the direction of new drug research. The FDA has recently proposed
changes in the disclosure regulations to permit the agency to reveal the
existence, but not the content, of the notices and applications. This
change, it feels, will provide "the public greater information about the
agency's workload and progress in reviewing those applications. 43
Neither the present nor the proposed agency regulations, however,
allow release of safety and effectiveness data, even in summary form,
before the FDA has acted on a pending NDA, with the exception of
those instances where the submitter has already made the information
public. Consequently, in most cases, the public is effectively precluded
from offering any input whatsoever into the agency's decision regard-
ing whether to allow marketing of a new drug.
III. CAN THE FDA RELEASE THE DATA UNDER PRESENT LAW.
In evaluating the FDA's contention that it is legally prohibited
from releasing safety and effectiveness data (beyond the summaries for
approved drugs), it will be helpful to pose a scenario in which the FDA
favors release and then examine the theories under which a drug devel-
oper might attempt to prevent such action. The best way for the agency
to establish a procedure for the release of the data would be through
the promulgation of appropriate regulations under both the FOIA and
5 U.S.C. § 301." The latter statute, a general housekeeping provision,
gives the head of each executive department the authority to promul-
gate regulations for "the custody, use, and preservation of its records,
papers, and property... [but] does not authorize withholding infor-
mation from the public or limiting the availability of records to the
40. 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.61, 314.14(e)(2) (1978). This, of course, allows a company to protect its
investment in new research techniques as well as the chemical entities themselves.
41. Id. § 312.5.
42. Id. § 314.14(b).
43. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,869, 12,870 (1978). The real value of this new procedure is that, like the
patent system, it will identify for the public and the company's competitors the areas in which
research is being conducted. This is one of the major criticisms of the present policy, and the
problem is addressed in the proposed legislation. See text accompanying notes 189-98 infra.
44. Section 301 was originally enacted in the Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 301,
80 Stat. 378.
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public."45 By basing the regulations on both statutes, the FDA would
protect itself from the argument that the FOIA cannot be relied upon
for authorization of the release of information that falls within its ex-
emptions.46 By its specific language, the FOIA "does not apply to mat-
ters" that fall within its nine exemptions.4 7 Thus, it might be argued
that because safety and effectiveness data fall within the trade secrets
exemption and the FOIA does not apply to that material, regulations
authorizing its release cannot be based on the FOIA. This position has
been taken by several courts.48 For this reason, regulations authorizing
the release of material falling within the exemptions should not be
based on the FOIA alone.
Section 301 provides an additional statutory basis for the regula-
tions. The legislative history49 shows that section 301 does not permit
the promulgation of regulations providing for the release of informa-
tion if that release is prohibited by another statute 50 But the FOIA is
not such a statute. Its exemptions are discretionary rather than
mandatory."1 The Supreme Court has stated that the exemptions re-
flect "congressional determination of the types of information that the
Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential, if it so
chooses.""2 There is abundant support for this position in the legisla-
tive history of the Act. One Senate report, for example, states that "[the
exemptions] are only permissive. They merely mark the outer limits of
information that may be withheld when the agency makes a specific
affirmative determination that the public interest and the specific cir-
cumstances dictate. . . that the information should be withheld.
53
45. 5 U.S.C § 301 (1976).
46. The submitters will claim that since the information falls within exemption 4 (the "trade
secrets" exemption) of the FOIA, the FDA either cannot or should not release it. See note 76 infra
and text accompanying notes 76-110 infra.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
48. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1975) ("if the memoranda do
fall within one of the Act's exempt categories, our inquiry is at an end, for the Act 'does not apply'
to such documents"); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. Department of HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 430 F. Supp. 1093, 1097 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977). One commentator has criticized this approach on the theory that such a restriction
on FOIA regulations converts the permissive exemptions into mandatory ones. Clement 620.
49. See text accompanying notes 152-57 infra.
50. Eg., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) (Trade Secrets Act); 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1976) (confidential-
ity provision of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act). (For a discussion of whether release of the safety
and effectiveness data under regulations issued as suggested above would violate those statutes,
see text accompanying notes 113-75 infra.) In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Supreme Court ap-
parently endorsed this view of section 301. 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1722 n.40 (1979).
51. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
52. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (emphasis added).
53. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) (emphasis in original); see H.R. REP. No.
876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); Clement 598-603. Although these congressional reports as well
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A. Reverse FOIA Suit-Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Standard
of Review.
If the FDA were to issue regulations authorizing the disclosure of
safety and effectiveness data, the submitters of that data would likely
seek injunctive relief in federal court through a "reverse FOIA suit." 4
For years there was disagreement about the proper mode of subject
matter jurisdiction in such cases. Although some courts have based ju-
risdiction on the FOIA itself,5 most have held that the Act "is a disclo-
sure statute and does not by its explicit terms confer jurisdiction over
an action seeking to prevent disclosure."5 6 Another conceivable source
of jurisdiction is the Trade Secrets Act, 7 a criminal statute. While
some courts have avoided this issue, 8 most agree that since the crimi-
nal penalties in the statute appear adequate,5 9 no civil cause of action
lies.60 Another possible avenue to jurisdiction-the Administrative
as others that state that the exemptions are discretionary are not the reports of the original act
itself, but rather of amendments to the FOIA and related legislation, they may be appropriately
used as authority. Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir.
1978).
Cases holding that the exemptions are permissive are legion. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th
Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d
1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705
(1979); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. Depart-
ment of HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
54. See generaly Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1977, 1978
DUKE L.J. 189, 204-10; Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-7he Reverse-FOA Suit,
1976 DUKE L.J 330.
55. See, e.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
56. Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 430 F. Supp. 1093, 1095 (E.D. Tenn.
1977); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978) (in the FOIA
"only requesters [of information] have been given a cause of action by the Congress").
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
58. In Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court wrote "we
express no opinion on whether § 1905 [the Trade Secrets Act] may constitute an independent basis
of jurisdiction for at least some 'reverse-FOIA' suits." Id. at 977 n.12; see Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. Department of HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
59. This statute provides for a fine of up to $1000, or imprisonment for up to one year, or
both, and automatic removal from office for any government employee who violates it.
60. The court in Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979), wrote:
[We] . . . reject the proposition that § 1905 [the Trade Secrets Act] . . . serve[s] as a
predicate for a private civil cause of action. Recent pronouncements of the Supreme
Court have severely limited the circumstances in which a federal court may imply a
private cause of action from a federal statute .... The adequacy of these penalties
would seem to assure the achievement of the Congressional objectives underlying
§ 1905.
565 F.2d at 1188 (footnotes omitted); the Supreme Court agreed with this analysis, 99 S. Ct. at
1725. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); General Dynamics
Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979). But
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Procedure Act (APA)61-was blocked by the Supreme Court when it
ruled in Cal/fano v. Sanders62 that section 10 of the APA does not grant
subject matter jurisdiction independent of other grounds.
Since Sanders, there has been general agreement that reverse-
FOIA suits may be heard under general federal question jurisdiction. 63
Because such actions are designed to prevent disclosure by a federal
agency or officer, there is no requirement of a $10,000 amount in con-
troversy.6. Some courts, recognizing the policy behind these exemp-
tions,65 have argued that the FOIA poses a federal question within the
court's equitable jurisdiction.66 Other courts have ruled more generally
that "federal question jurisdiction may be sustained whether the action
is viewed as 'arising under' [the] FOIA itself or whether it is conceived
more broadly as the assertion of a private party's right 'to be free from
agency action which adversely affects him and is not authorized by fed-
eral law.' ,,67 Thus, it is clear that the submitters will not find subject
matter jurisdiction an obstacle to having a court hear their challenge to
the FDA disclosure regulations.
Next, the court must determine the proper standard of review.
This is a two-step process. If the FDA were to contest whether safety
and effectiveness data falls within the trade secrets exemption of the
FOIA, then the court would be required to conduct a full review on this
issue.68 It is unlikely, however, that the agency would dispute this
point. Rather, it would argue that although the data does fall within an
exemption, the agency has discretionary authority to disclose such in-
formation and the decision to release can be set aside only if it is found
to constitute an abuse of discretion. This position, adopting the stan-
see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
924 (1977).
61. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). Cases finding jurisdiction under the APA include Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. Department of HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parkridge Hosp., Inc.
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 430 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
62. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
65. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
66. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826
(1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 924 (1977); Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974).
67. Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting 1976 Note,
supra note 54, at 352); see 1978 Note, supra note 54, at 206-10.
68. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1208 n.57 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. Department of HUD, 519 F.2d 935,
940-41 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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dard of the APA,69 has been accepted by a majority of the courts.7 0
There is some authority for the proposition that if the submitter of
information were to bring suit for a declaratory judgment prior to any
release of data by the agency, then the standard of review would not be
limited to the APA "abuse of discretion" test.7' Since the agency has
not acted, it is argued, there is no act to which agency discretion can be
applied. This argument ignores the limitations of declaratory judgment
procedure: it "will not be used to pre-empt and prejudge issues that are
committed for initial decision to an administrative body or special tri-
bunal any more than it will be used as a substitute for statutory meth-
ods of review."' 72 As one court recently stated, "[tjo construe the
Declaratory Judgment Act to permit a federal court to conduct a trial
de novo in reverse FOIA cases would transfer primary decisional re-
sponsibility for agency disclosures from the administrative agencies to
the federal courts. 73 Thus, it appears that the burden will be on the
submitters of the data to show that release would involve an abuse of
agency discretion.
B. Arguments of the Submitters to Prevent Release of the Data by the
FDA.
The submitters of safety and effectiveness data might rely on sev-
eral theories emanating from the FOIA, the Trade Secrets Act74 and
the confidentiality provision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act75 in
an effort to prevent FDA disclosure of the data. Before the submitters
can advance the intricacies of these theories, however, they must pre-
vail on the threshold issue of whether the safety and effectiveness data
falls within the protection of exemption 4 of the FOIA.76 That provi-
sion covers two kinds of material: first, trade secrets and, second, "in-
formation which is (a) commercial or financial, (b) obtained from a
person, and (c) privileged or confidential. The exemption given by the
69. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
70. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d
627 (5th Cir. 1976).
71. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1381 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
826 (1977).
72. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246 (1952).
73. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1191 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1976).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential.
296 [Vol. 1979:286
Vol. 1979:286] SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DA4T 297
Congress does not apply to information which does not satisfy the three
requirements stated in the statute.
77
Almost all of the litigation over this exemption has dealt with the
second part, while very few cases have construed the term "trade
secrets." However, the confidentiality provision of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act refers to "any method or process which as a trade secret
is entitled to protection,"78 and therefore it is necessary to determine
whether safety and effectiveness data constitutes a trade secret.
Nowhere is the scope of the term "trade secret" definitively deline-
ated for purposes of the FOIA. The legislative history contains no
statement of congressional intent with respect to the coverage of the
term in this context, nor has the Supreme Court ruled on the question.
One definition, that of the Restatement of Torts, has received a great
deal of attention. It states that a trade secret is "any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it."79 The Supreme Court, citing this defini-
tion as one "widely relied-upon,"8 applied it in a case involving a pat-
ent problem. Several lower federal courts have used the Restatement
definition in exemption 4 cases,8 ' but that application has been
mechanical and the courts have offered no explanation of the appropri-
ateness of this definition as applied to the FOIA. Finally, the FDA
itself relied upon the Restatement definition in the preamble to the
Public Information Regulations. 2
An alternate definition of the term "trade secret" is found in Con-
sumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration.83 In
its discussion of the scope of the term "trade secret" in the context of
disclosure prohibited by the Trade Secret Act,8 4 the court stated that it
was aware of only one case-law definition: "an unpatented, secret,
commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, or process, which is
used for the making, preparing, compounding, treating, or processing
77. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp.
796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); accord, Getman
v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Kuersteiner & Herbach, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act: An Examination of the Commercial or Financial Exemption, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
193, 200 (1976).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1976). See text accompanying notes 165-75 infra.
79. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
80. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974).
81. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976); Chevron Chem. Co.
v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1031-32 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
82. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612 (1974).
83. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
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of articles or materials which are trade commodities."8 5
Clearly, the Restatement definition is much broader than the one
set forth in Consumers Union. Although both definitions require cer-
tain fundamental elements of trade secrecy-that the information be
secret, commercially valuable, used in one's business and not generally
known within the industry-the Restatement definition covers any
kind of information that gives the possessor of the secret a commercial
advantage. The more limited Consumers Union definition, on the other
hand, protects only certain types of information (a "plan, appliance,
formula, or process") used for certain specified purposes ("the making,
preparing, compounding, treating, or processing. . . of trade commod-
ities").
The arguments in favor of adopting the Restatement definition for
FOIA purposes are centered around its comprehensiveness and its
widespread usage. First, the FOIA exemptions, regardless of whether
they' are viewed as mandatory or permissive," are indicative of con-
gressional concern for the protection of submitters' information. 7 The
House report on the original FOIA states the purpose of the fourth
exemption:
This exemption would assure the confidentiality of information ob-
tained by the Government through questionnaires or through mate-
rial submitted .... It exempts such material if it would not
customarily'be made public by the person from whom it was ob-
tained by the Government. The exemption would include... scien-
tific or manufacturing processes or developments .... It would also
include information which is given to an agency in confidence, since
a citizen must be able to confide in his Government. 8
The exemption does, therefore, protect submitters of financial or com-
mercial data to government agencies "from the competitive disadvan-
tages which would result from its publication."8 9 The Restatement
definition, covering any kind of trade secret information that gives its
holder a competitive advantage, conforms closely to the purpose of the
85. 301 F. Supp. at 801 (quoting United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v.
United States Tariff Comm'n, 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925), rev'don other ground&, 274 U.S.
106 (1927)).
86. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
87. Clement 593.
88. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD
NEWS 2418, 2423.
This is not to say that an agency's promise of confidentiality to the submitter is binding. "It
will obviously not be enough for the agency to assert simply that it received the file under a pledge
of confidentiality to the one who supplied it. Undertakings of that nature can not, in and of
themselves, override the Act." Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969); accord,
Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
89. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 1979:286
Vol. 1979:286] SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA 299
fourth exemption.
A second argument favoring application of the Restatement defi-
nition to safety and effectiveness data is based on the fact that the FDA
has endorsed this definition in the past. The preamble to the 1974
FOIA regulations states:
IT]he Restatement definition of a trade secret should remain the ba-
sic guideline for application of this exemption from the Freedom of
Information Act. The Supreme Court has recently noted that the Re-
statement definition of a trade secret is "widely relied upon," ....
The Commissioner [of Drugs] can find no reason why it should be
utilized for determining commercial damages but not for purposes of
the Freedom of Information Act.90
Although the agency cannot alter the provisions of the FOIA by its
own express or implied promises of confidentiality, 9' it was clearly the
intent of Congress that agency practices and the expectations of the
submitter should be considered in determining the applicability of the
fourth exemption. 92 In view of the FDA's endorsement of the Restate-
ment definition, there is clear justification for reliance on that definition
by the submitter.
A third reason for applying the Restatement definition is the fact
that it is the most widely used definition of a trade secret and it has
been adopted by many state courts and legislatures. In the absence of
any definition in the FOIA, it can be implied that Congress intended
the term to have the scope accorded to it by common use. Advocates of
the narrower Consumers Union definition will argue that the Restate-
ment definition, which evolved out of tort law dealing with breaches of
trust by former employees, has no application to the FOIA. However,
in view of the close conformity of the Restatement definition to the
purpose of the fourth exemption, its endorsement by the FDA and its
general acceptance, the court in construing the term "trade secret" in
the context of the FOIA likely would adopt the Restatement definition.
If that definition were accepted, it seems clear that safety and ef-
fectiveness data would be found to constitute a trade secret. Although
some argument could be made that the data is not a method or proc-
ess93 as required under the narrower definition,94 it certainly is a "com-
pilation of information." Given the requirement for submission of the
data in order to obtain a license to market the drug, there can be no
90. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612 (1974).
91. See note 88 supra.
92. See note 88 supra. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
93. The protocol itself clearly is a method or process.
94. See text accompanying notes 165-75 infra.
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doubt that the data is "used in one's business." Finally, considering the
tens of millions of dollars generally required for the development of the
data, the knowledge contained in it and the resulting license if the
NDA is approved, the data clearly gives its developer "an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it," especially in the case of
unpatented drugs.
The conclusion that safety and effectiveness data constitutes a
trade secret is strengthened by the recognition of a helpful distinction
between trade secrets and confidential commercial information. The
competitive advantage associated with a technological trade secret is
almost always jeopardized by any disclosure to competitors, even if the
source of the data is not revealed. Confidential commercial informa-
tion, on the other hand, can usually be released without any competi-
tive harm if the source of the data is withheld. 95 Thus, for example,
affirmative action plans are always considered under the "confidential
commercial or financial information" part of exemption 4 and not as
trade secrets.96 Those plans would be of.virtually no practical value to
competitors unless accompanied by information identifying the firm
implementing such plans. This is clearly not the case with safety and
effectiveness data. Publication without attribution would be as harmful
as release with attribution. In either case, data costing millions of dol-
lars to compile would be available to competitors for their own drug
development at no real cost. This would inevitably cause competitive
harm.97
1. The Material Falls Within Exemption 4 and Therefore Should
Not be Disclosed. Submitters seeking to protect the confidentiality of
safety and effectiveness data would first argue that the agency should
not be permitted to release material exempt from the disclosure re-
95. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 6.02A[2], at 6-46.15 n.26.
96. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); General Dy-
namics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2024
(1979).
97. The question of the applicability of exemption 4 to safety and effectiveness data was
addressed in Morgan v. FDA [1974 Transfer Binder] FOOD DRUG Cos. L. REP (CCH) 41,147
(D.C. Cir. 1974). In that case, the plaintiff sought disclosure of safety and effectiveness data for
certain oral contraceptives. The FDA refused to disclose this information and argued that the
data fell within exemption 4. The agency was awarded summary judgment because the plaintiff
failed to contest the FDA's assertion that the data was either a trade secret or confidential com-
mercial information.
Here, of course, we are dealing with a situation in which the FDA is seeking to release the
data, not withhold it. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) and 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (1976) impose
criminal sanctions for the unlawful release of trade secrets, it is necessary to determine whether
safety and effectiveness data constitutes a trade secret. The Morgan court did not find it necessary
to address this issue.
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quirements of the FOIA, especially when that disclosure could cause
serious competitive harm. In cases seeking to force an agency to re-
lease rather than withhold data, courts have held that exemption 4
"may be invoked [by the agency] for the benefit of the person who has
provided commercial or financial information if it can be shown that
public disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to his competitive
position."98 The legislative history of the Act contains numerous indi-
cations of congressional intent to establish "workable standards for
what records should and should not be open to public inspection."99
Yet, despite this concern, most courts and the subsequent legisla-
tive history agree that the FOIA exemptions are permissive'00 and that
an agency decision to release information can be set aside only for an
abuse of administrative discretion. 0 1 In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Schlesinger,l0 2 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is known
for its narrow reading of the permissible scope of disclosure under the
FOIA, 103 stated:
So far as exempt information is concerned, the Act... "neither au-
thorizes [n]or prohibits the disclosure of such information," and the
disclosure of such exempt information is ordinarily discretionary
with the agency .... [W]hen review of an administrative decision to
disclose is sought ... under the APA, . . . it is subject to reversal if
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion "or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law."' 1 4
Two tests are applied by the courts in determining whether an
agency has abused its discretion by releasing data that falls within an
exemption to the FOIA. If the agency's decision is to be upheld, the
court must first be assured that the decision was based upon a consider-
ation of all relevant factors and that the reasons stated provide support
for the decision.'0 5 In making this determination, the court must be
convinced that the agency has considered the possible harm to both the
submitter of the data and the general public as a result of disclosure, as
98. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
99. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965), quoted in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1211 (4th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added by Westinghouse court).
100. See note 53 supra and text accompanying notes 47-53 supra. The Supreme Court has
recently confirmed that the exemptions are permissive. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705
(1979).
101., See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
102. 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976).
103. Compare Westinghouse with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckard, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.
1978), General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacatedandremanded,
99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979) and Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacatedand
remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
104. 542 F.2d at 1197-98 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976)).
105. Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 1976).
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well as resulting benefits. The court will also want assurances from the
agency that there is no alternative disclosure plan that could provide
the benefits of disclosure with less harm to private and public inter-
ests. 10
6
If the FDA, after consideration of all relevant factors and alterna-
tives, were to promulgate regulations providing for the disclosure of
safety and effectiveness data based on-its'conclusion that the benefits of
disclosure-opening up agency decision making, curtailing unneces-
sary and expensive duplicative testing, and sharing of scientific exper-
tise-outweigh possible harms such as reduced incentive for research
and development of new drugs, a court would probably defer to agency
expertise and would not be willing to set the regulations aside under
the first abuse-of-discretion test. The task of constructing the cost-ben-
efit calculus lies with the agency and not the courts. If the FDA's eval-
uation of the impact of disclosure takes into account all relevant
factors, it would be quite difficult for a judge to find that calculus incor-
rect. The instinct of a court when confronted with such a problem will
almost inevitably be to defer to agency expertise. With regard to the
FDA's present disclosure policy, one court noted that in promulgating
the disclosure regulations, the agency was acting in an area "which di-
rectly concerns the realm of its special expertise and administrative ex-
perience. In reviewing the merits of the case this is an important
consideration."' 7 The deference accorded to the FDA is probably
greater than that given to other agencies because its decisions are usu-
ally based on very technical scientific analysis rather than legal or polit-
ical theories and because of respect for medical decision making.'08
The second test of whether an abuse of administrative discretion
has occurred requires a determination of whether the act complained of
would constitute a violation of another statute. This was made clear in
Charles River Park 'A Inc. v. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment:'0 9 "[Ihf the disclosure of the information involved here
would constitute a violation of a criminal statute, it would be an abuse
106. Id. at 632.
107. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C.
1975).
108. This point was vividly made by one FDA observer.
[E]very experienced food and drug lawyer will tell you that in 999 out of 1,000 cases,
even the most sanguine counsel knows that he hasn't a prayer of persuading an appellate
court to second-guess the FDA ....
It is indeed a sturdy appellate judge who is not tempted to clutch his stomach, to
recall every episode of family illness, and to react in favor of those who march under the
banner of protecting the aged, lactating mothers, and infant children.
Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette: An Inquiry Into the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and
CosmeticAct, 51 CAL. L. REV. 38, 45 (1963).
109. 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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of discretion for an agency to ignore such a statutory mandate and re-
lease the information."110 Thus, before the FDA can release safety and
effectiveness data, it must be shown that disclosure would violate
neither the Trade Secrets Act"' nor the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act.' 12
2. The Trade Secrets Act Prohibits Release. The submitters' sec-
110. Id. at 942.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
112. The confidentiality provision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is found at 21 U.S.C.
§ 3310) (1976).
That the FOIA should not be construed to overrule statutes prohibiting disclosure is a con-
cern expressed throughout the Act's legislative history. This concern is written into the Act itself,
and exemption 3 states that the Act "does not apply to matters that are... speciflcall, exempted
from disclosure by statute.., provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishesparticular
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
There has been disagreement whether 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), the Trade Secrets Act, falls
within the scope of exemption 3. In FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), the Supreme Court
ruled that the exemption did cover a provision of the FAA Act that gave the agency blanket
discretion to withhold information. Congress reacted to Robertson by amending exemption 3 to
read as quoted above in order to narrow its scope to those statutes that require withholding of
specific information. Most courts have held that exemption 3 "does not incorporate section 1905
into the FOIA in such a way as to make section 1905 broader than the fourth exemption." Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. Department of HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.7 (1975). Thus, the test for
purposes of exemption 3 is whether the information falls within both exemption 4 and § 1905. Id.
This approach of the Charles River Park court was cited with approval by the House Committee
on Government Operations in its consideration of the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976) and scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.):
[I]f material did not come within the broad trade secrets exemption contained in the
Freedom of Information Act, section 1905 would not justify withholding; on the other
hand, if material is within the trade secrets exemption of the Freedom of Information
Act and therefore subject to disclosure if the agency determines that disclosure is in the
public interest, section 1905 must be considered to ascertain whether the agency is for-
bidden from disclosing the information.
H.R. REP. No. 880, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2183, 2205; see National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 686-87
(D.C. Cir. 1976). One court noted that the legislative history on the 1976 amendment "indicate[s]
that one of the purposes... is to assure that § 1905 is not considered to be within the ambit of
exemption (b)(3)." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 158 n.15 (D.D.C. 1976).
Another court recently declared that "§ 1905 does not qualify as an exemption 3 statute." Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736, 742 (D. Md. 1978).
Thus, it remains to be determined only that safety and effectiveness data falls within the
scope of section 1905. This question is addressed in the next section of the Comment.
As for 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1976), the confidentiality provision of the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, there is no question that it is specific and narrow enough to qualify as an exemption 3
statute. Thus, even if safety and effectiveness data is found not to be exempt from the FOIA
through exemption 4, it would be exempt from the Act through exemption 3, if safety and effec-
tiveness data is protected by section 3310). That question is addressed in the text accompanying
notes 165-75 infra.
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ond line of defense would be the argument that release of safety and
effectiveness data would violate the Trade Secrets Act,' 13 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905, which prohibits any disclosure of protected material (relating to
trade secrets or confidential statistical data) that is "not authorized by
law."
The first question to be addressed is whether section 1905 and ex-
emption 4 are coextensive. In the view of the FDA, the scope of the
two sections is practically identical:
The Commissioner [of Drugs] concludes that it is not feasible or
practical to determine the differences, if any, between the confidenti-
ality provisions in 18 U.S.C. [§] 1905 . . .and in the Freedom of
Information Act. If there are any differences, they are extremely sub-
tle and small. Accordingly, the Commissioner intends. . . to regard
the coverage of these provisions as identical.14
Several courts have also found the two provisions to be identical.
They have done so, however, by misreading both precedent and legisla-
tive history. In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger,1 5 the court
stated that
it has been uniformly held that the scope of § 1905 and Exemption 4
of the FOIA are ... the 'same' or. . . "co-extensive." Accordingly,
material qualifying for exemption under (b)(4) falls within the mate-
rial, disclosure of which is prohibited under § 1905. And this was the
specific holding in Charles River Park .... 116
Yet, the Charles River Park court held only that "if the disclosure
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) provides:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any
extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employ-
ment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or
return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or
employee, thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data,
amount or source of any income, profits, losses or expenditures of any person, firm, part-
nership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any
book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person
except as provided by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
114. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612 (1974). In a suit challenging the agency's procedure for noti-
fication of submitters when there is a FOIA request for their information, the FDA agreed that the
provisions of§ 1905 and exemption 4 are "for the purposes of this suit, the same." Pharmaceuti-
cal Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C. 1975).
This reasoning was criticized in Pendergast, Problems and Opportunities Under the Public In-
formation Regulations of the FDA, 30 FOOD, DRUG & CosM. L.J. 326, 334 n.35: "The FDA cites
no authority for this conclusion and it could lead to trouble. The distinction may be, as the FDA
says, 'subtle,' but subtle differences can cause major arguments."
The Supreme Court did not address this question in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705
(1979).
115. 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
116. 542 F.2d at 1204 n.38 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 1979:286
Vol. 1979:2861 SAF1ETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DA TA4 305
of the information involved here would constitute a violation of a crim-
inal statute, it would be an abuse of discretion for an agency to ignore
such a statutory mandate and release the information."' 1 7 In fact,
Charles River Park, in a footnote to which the Westinghouse court re-
fers, clearly indicates that section 1905 and exemption 4 are not of the
same scope: "Since only the FOIA's fourth exemption deals with mat-
ters covered by section 1905, consideration of section 1905 in FOIA
cases is appropriate only when the information falls both within the
fourth exemption and under section 1905." 11 This statement implies
that the two provisions are not identical in scope. If they were, the
court probably would have simply stated that the only inquiry must be
whether the release is "authorized by law."" 9
Similarly, the court in Westchester Genera/Hospital, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Wefare 20 found that section 1905 and
exemption 4 "are equivalent in scope."'' This conclusion, like that in
Westinghouse, was based on Charles River Park, but the court went on
to quote legislative history in defense of its finding. It claimed that the
following statement from the House report on the 1976 amendments to
the FOIA shows the congruence of the two provisions: "[I]f material
did not come within the broad trade secrets exemption contained in the
Freedom of Information Act, section 1905 would not justify [nondisclo-
sure] . . ,. . However, this passage only indicates that section 1905
is not broader than exemption 4. It clearly leaves open the possibility
that data can be exempt from the FOIA through exemption 4 and still
be disclosed, at the agency's discretion, in situations where section 1905
does not apply. The House report relied upon in Westchester General
Hospital goes on to make this point. Immediately after the section
quoted by the court, the report states that "if material is within the
trade secrets exemption . . . and therefore subject to disclosure if the
agency determines that disclosure is in the public interest, section 1905
must be considered to ascertain whether the agency is forbidden from
disclosing the information."'" Again, were the provisions identical in
scope, Congress could have stated more precisely that the only question
117. 519 F.2d at 942 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 942 n.7 (emphasis added).
119. See text accompanying notes 148-64 infra.
120. 434 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
121. Id. at 439.
122. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 880, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, repr in [19761 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2205).
123. H.R. REp. No. 880, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2183, 2205, quotedin Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736, 743
(D. Md. 1978).
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was whether the disclosure was authorized.
The contention that exemption 4 is broader than section 1905
might, at first glance, seem erroneous. Whereas the former protects
trade secrets and certain privileged commercial or financial informa-
tion, the release of which would cause serious competitive harm,14 the
latter seemingly protects anything that "concerns or relates to ...
trade secrets," as well as a list of other kinds of information. 2 5 This
dilemma is resolved by examining the historical roots of the present
section 1905,126 enacted as part of the 1948 codification of the federal
criminal code. The new section combined three preexisting laws: first,
an income tax statute prohibiting disclosure of any data (including the
operations of any business) gathered in the course of an IRS investiga-
tion or found in tax returns;127 second, a tariff commission statute for-
bidding disclosure of "trade secrets. . . embraced in any examination
or investigation" by the Tariff Commission; 28 and, finally, a statute
directing the Commerce Department not to disclose "statistical infor-
mation furnished in confidence to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
124. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
125. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
126. See Clement 607-13; Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
127. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976)) provided:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any collector, deputy collector, agent, clerk or other officer
or employe of the United States to divulge or to make known in any manner whatever
not provided by law to any person in the operations, style of work or apparatus of any
manufacturer or producer visited by him in the discharge of his official duties, or the
amount or source of income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof, set
forth or disclosed in any income return. . .. or to permit any income return or copy
thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof, to be seen or ex-
amined by any person except as provided by law; and it shall be unlawful for any person
to print or publish in any manner whatever not provided by law any income, return, or
any part thereof or source of income, profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any
income return; and any offense against the foregoing provision shall be a misdemeanor
and be punished by a fine not exceeding one-thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court; and if the offender be an
officer or employee of the United States he shall be dismissed from office and be incapa-
ble thereafter of holding any office under the Government.
128. Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, § 335, 46 Stat. 590 (current verion at 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976)) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any member of the commission, or for any employee, agent,
or clerk of the commission, or any other officer or employee of the United States, to
divulge, or to make known in any manner whatever not provided for by law, to any
person, the trade secrets or processes of any person, firm, copartnership, corporation, or
association embraced in any examination or investigation conducted by the commission,
or by order of the commission, or by order of any member thereof. Any offense against
the provisions of this section shall be a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine not
exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion
of the court, and such offender shall also be dismissed from office or discharged from
employment.
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Commerce."'12 9 Much of the original language of these statutes has
been iicorporated into section 1905, but, "taken literally, the consoli-
dated version... has a tremendously broader scope than the original
three statutes."' 130
Nevertheless, according to the legislative history of the codification
statute, it was not the intent of Congress "to create any substantive
changes in existing criminal statutes but merely to rearrange and con-
solidate them."' 3 1 The Senate report states that the purpose of the 1948
revision was to make it "easy to find the criminal statutes because of
the arrangement, numbering, and classification. The original intent of
Congress is preserved."' 132  In addition, the Reviser's Notes in the
House report indicate that, with respect to the three statutes combined
in section 1905, only "[m]inor changes were made in translations and
phraseology."' 133
The Supreme Court has recognized that the 1948 codification of
the criminal code was not designed to bring about substantive change
in the criminal laws. In United States v. Cook, 34 the Court examined
the effect of codification on an embezzlement statute. The Court stated:
"The general purpose of the new Code was to 'codify and revise ....
The original intent of Congress is preserved,'. . . and. . . the reviser's
note. . . disclosed no intention of making any change in the substan-
tive content or the coverage of the law."' 35 As one commentator has
argued, "[t]he Cook decision supports the proposition that the 1948
codification statute should not be interpreted as having created any
substantive change in the meaning of the predecessor nondisclosure
statutes . . . . [T]he [new] statute should be interpreted according to
the legislative intent underlying the original statute[s]."' 36
Thus, it appears that the scope of section 1905 is much narrower
129. Act of Jan. 27, 1938, ch. 11, § 1, 52 Stat. 8 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976))
provided:
[A]ny statistical information furnished in confidence to the Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce by individuals, corporations, and firms shall be held to be confi-
dential, and shall be used only for the statistical purpose for which it is supplied. The
Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce shall not permit anyone
other than the sworn employees of the Bureau to examine such individual reports, nor
shall he permit any statistics of domestic commerce to be published in such manner as to
reveal the identity of the individual, corporation, or firm furnishing such data.
130. Clement 614 (footnote omitted).
131. Id.
132. S. REp. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948) (remarks of Sen. Wiley), quotedin Clem-
ent 614.
133. H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A128, quoted in Clement 614 n.116.
134. 384 U.S. 257 (1966).
135. Id. at 260 (quoting S. REp. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948)); see Clement 615.
136. Clement 615-16 (footnote omitted). This article has been cited with approval in recent
cases. See, eg., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1200 n.9 (7th Cir. 1978).
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than its language would indicate. It is, as the legislative history of the
1976 FOIA amendment recognizes, 137 much narrower than the FOIA's
fourth exemption. This conclusion is corroborated by the very nature
of the provisions; the fourth exemption merely creates an area for the
exercise of administrative discretion, while section 1905 is a criminal
statute that must be construed narrowly. Should this historical view of
the scope of section 1905 be accepted, it clearly would not prohibit dis-
closure of safety and effectiveness data, for that data is not collected in
the course of tax or tariff activity or submitted to the Bureau of Foreign
or Domestic Commerce.
Even if this historical analysis is rejected, it does not necessarily
follow that disclosure of safety and effectiveness data by the FDA
would be prohibited by section 1905. One reason is that it is not clear
whether section 1905 was intended to limit an agency's authority to
disclose information. Perhaps it was the intent of Congress not to
restrict agency action, but simply to penalize unauthorized disclosure
by individual employees. If so, FDA disclosure of safety and effective-
ness data in accordance with properly promulgated regulations would
not constitute a violation of section 1905.138 There is no definitive an-
swer to what the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sears, Roebuck
and Co. v. Eckerd3 9 called this "difficult and as yet unresolved ques-
tion." 140 Yet, the Sears court offered two reasons for viewing the provi-
sion as restricting unauthorized individual acts and not agency decision
making. First, the legislative history of the income tax statute that was
codified as section 1905 14 indicates that one of the primary concerns of
Congress was the untrustworthiness of tax officials. That statute, origi-
nally enacted in 1864,142 was modified by the Tariff Act of 1894,143
another part of which required corporations to maintain financial
records for inspection by tax officials.'" In the context of the latter
section, Senator Aldrich, in a statement partially quoted by the Sears
court, 145 emphasized the need to constrain individual agents: "The
secrets of the business of every corporation in the United States are
practically to be made known to competitors or made public by this
137. See text accompanying notes 122-23 supra.
138. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978). The Supreme
Court has seemingly rejected this argument. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
139. 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
140. Id. at 1201.
141. See note 127 supra.
142. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat. 223.
143. Ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509.
144. Id. §§ 35-36.
145. 575 F.2d at 1201.
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provision .... [These secrets] are to be turned over to the tender
mercies of poorly paid revenue agents." '46 Second, the Sears court
noted that there are no provisions for penalizing or restraining the
agency. "Even if the legislative history were unclear," the court rea-
soned, "limiting the statute's focus to actions by agency employees
seems more consistent with the statutory scheme because the enforce-
ment mechanism of the statute provides only penalties for guilty indi-
viduals and offers no restraint on agency action."147
A second reason why the FDA's disclosure of safety and effective-
ness data would not necessarily be prohibited by section 1905 is that,
regardless of the section's focus, it does not absolutely prohibit disclo-
sure of information that comes within its scope, but merely precludes
disclosures that are "not authorized by law."' 148 Clearly, the FOIA can-
not provide the necessary authorization for the hypothetical disclosure
regulations allowing FDA release of safety and effectiveness data be-
cause the Act "does not apply" to material that falls within the FOIA's
fourth exemption. But, anticipating that problem, it was hypothesized
that the regulations were promulgated under section 301149 as well.
Thus, the question posed is whether regulations under section 301
would be regarded as "authorization by law" for the purpose of avoid-
ing the prohibitions of section 1905.150
In authorizing agency regulations for "the custody, use, and pres-
ervation of its records, papers, and property,"'' section 301 makes no
reference to the permissible scope of disclosure of data held by an
agency. In 1958, because of concern that agencies were using this gen-
eral housekeeping provision as authority to withhold information from
the public, 52 the statute was amended to include a second sentence:
"This section does not authorize withholding information from the
public or limiting the availability of records to the public."' 53 Another
amendment that would have added "nor shall this section be construed
as requiring the giving of information or the making of records avail-
146. 26 CONG. REc. 6893 (1894), quotedin Clement 610 n.100.
147. 575 F.2d at 1201. But see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. at 1716.
148. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
150. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra. The Supreme Court has just ruled that § 301
"was not intended to provide authority for limiting the scope of§ 1905. Chrysler v. Brown, 99 S.
Ct. at 1721-22.
151. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
152. "It appears that this section has been used too often by too many Government depart-
ments, agencies, and officials as an excuse for withholding information from the general public."
104 CONG. REc. 6548 (1958) (statement of Rep. Brown).
153. Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976)).
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able" was rejected.' 54
The legislative debates on the 1958 amendment shed no light on
whether regulations under section 301 can authorize release of data
covered by section 1905. The chief proponent of the amendment, Rep-
resentative Moss, stated that the amendment "does not affect the confi-
dential status of information given to the Government and carefully
detailed in. . . section 1905."'' 1 Another supporter said that "it would
still be a violation of law for any agency of Government or any Gov-
ernment official to make public any of the records for which secrecy is
provided by any of some 78 separate statutes."' 56 Thus, the 1958
amendment was not intended to change government policy. "It merely
defines the intent of the Congress which, in 1789, first voted this house-
keeping authority. . . . It says to the departments of Government 'if
you desire to withhold the information from anyone, including the
Congress, then seek specific authority.' "157 Unfortunately, the ques-
tion whether section 1905, which specifically states that disclosures that
are authorized by law are permissible, was subject to section 301 regu-
lations was never addressed.
Not surprisingly, the federal circuit courts are in conflict over this
issue. In Charles River Park, the D.C. Circuit held that "[s]ection 301
does not authorize regulations limiting the scope of section 1905." 158
This finding was based on the fact that the 1958 amendment was not
intended to affect section 1905.119 Yet this leaves unresolved the ques-
tion whether the pre-1958 housekeeping provision would authorize
such regulations. One commentator has argued that "past interpreta-
tions of section 1905 and other similar nondisclosure statutes imply that
agency regulations constitute one form of law capable of authorizing
disclosure within the meaning of section 1905."160 This approach was
accepted by the Third Circuit, and in Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger16 1
the court wrote:
We have been referred to no legislative history suggesting that
§ 1905, a 1948 codification of a group of statutes applicable to spe-
cific agencies, was intended to limit the longstanding rulemaking au-
154. 104 CONG. REC. 6567-69 (1958).
155. Id. 6550.
156. Id. 6548 (remarks of Rep. Brown).
157. Id. 6550 (remarks of Rep. Moss).
158. 519 F.2d at 942-43.
159. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
160. Clement 618-19 (footnote omitted). This commentator notes that "as early as 1864 ad-
ministrative orders issued pursuant to § 1905's predecessor income tax nondisclosure statute au-
thorized and restricted disclosure of tax-related information." Id. 619 n.136.
161. 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated amd remanded sub noma. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
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thority under the 1874 codification of the housekeeping statute ....
Congressman Moss only stated that the amendment would not affect
the confidential status of information covered by § 1905. Such an
interpretation of the 1958 amendment is totally at odds with its cen-
tral purpose-the elimination of governmental secrecy-as it would
transmogrify § 1905 into a weapon for those parties who advocate
government secrecy. Thus. . .§ 301 is a separate source of agency
authority for the promulgation of disclosure regulations and. . . dis-
closures pursuant to such regulations are authorized by law and im-
mune from the prohibitions of § 1905.162
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd,1 63 the Seventh Circuit specifically
concurred in this view. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this
analysis in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown.1"
The foregoing discussion indicates that it would be quite difficult
for the submitters of safety and effectiveness data to prevail on the con-
tention that the Trade Secrets Act prevents FDA disclosure of that
data. They would have'to convince a court, first, that the proper scope
of section 1905 wouid encompass all matters relating to trade secrets
and not just those protected in the statutes which were incorporated
into the 1948 codification; second, that section 1905 is addressed to dis-
closure by official agency action as well as unauthorized acts of individ-
ual employees; and, finally, that regulations properly promulgated
under section 301 would not constitute "authorization by law" for pur-
poses of section 1905. The Supreme Court has recently given the sub-
mitters ammunition on the last two points. The first question, however,
remains open.
3. The Confidentiality Provision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act Prohibits Release. The submitters' third line of argument would
be that disclosure of safety and effectiveness data is prohibited by the
confidentiality provision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, section
331(j), which prohibits "[tihe using by any person to his own advan-
tage, or revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or employees
of the Department [of HEW], or to the courts when relevant in any
judicial proceeding under this chapter, any information. . . concern-
ing any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protec-
tion."165 The scope of section 331(j) has not been clearly delineated by
the courts, and the legislative history is quite ambiguous on this matter.
On its face, the statute does not protect all trade secrets, but only
those methods or processes that qualify as trade secrets. However,
162. 565 F.2d at 1187 (footnotes omitted).
163. 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
164. 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1722-23 (1979).
165. 21 U.S.C. § 3316) (1976).
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neither Congress nor the FDA seems to have consistently adhered to
this view. In the 1962 revision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
the House of Representatives passed a provision that would have ex-
panded the scope of section 33 (j) to cover all trade secrets acquired by
the FDA.1 66 The Senate, fearing that such a provision would inhibit
FDA efforts to warn the public regarding potential dangers, rejected
that provision. 67 This change was not included in the final version of
the Act, but the conference report does contain a statement indicative
of a congressional belief that section 331(j) already encompassed all
trade secrets:
It is expected, of course, that since the Congress is not making the
law more restrictive on this matter, the FDA will not make its inter-
pretation and administration of [the] section ... more restrictive.
Congress and the public deserve to have access to information in the
Food and Drug Administration which is not of the nature of a trade
secret and is in the public interest.
1 68
At that time, the FDA also maintained that the protection of sec-
tion 33 1(j) should not be limited to methods and processes. In fact, the
FDA's position, as reflected in an in-house memorandum in 1960, was
clearly overbroad:
[The FDA] has uniformly treated all material submitted to it in new
drug applications as being confidential whether or not 'trade secrets'
were involved .... [This relieves the FDA] of the risk of having to
determine whether or not every particular piece of information is or
is not a 'trade secret' ....169
In the 1974 Public Information Regulations, the FDA recognized
the need for a somewhat narrower construction of the scope of section
331(j), but still insisted that all trade secrets, not just methods and
processes, were protected. 170 It seems, however, that the FDA was not
very certain of this stance. It fell back upon "the consistent administra-
tive interpretation that this statutory provision can encompass animal
and human [safety and effectiveness] data"'' and concluded that be-
cause of that "longstanding interpretation," release of safety and effec-
166. H.R. REP. No. 2464, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1962); INTERIM REPORT 9.
167. CONF. REP. No. 2526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2927, 2935; INTERIM REPORT 9.
168. Hearings on Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation Before the Sub-
comm. on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Senate Comm on Government Op-
erations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1191 (remarks of Sen. Kefauver), quoted in INTERIM
REPORT 10.
169. Memorandum from William F. Goodrich, Assistant General Counsel, FDA, to Bill V.
McFarland, Assistant Director, Division of Federal-State Relations, FDA (1960), quoted in IN-
TERIM REPORT 8.
170. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,612 (1974).
171. Id. 44,602.
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tiveness data would be improper.172 The agency was apparently unsure
of the validity of this argument and continued, "regardless of the scope
of section 331(j) . ..the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1905 and the trade
secrets exemption of the Freedom of Information Act are clearly appli-
cable to such data." 173 It has been shown, however, that these statutes
do not necessarily preclude disclosure.
Clearly, the nondisclosure requirement of section 331(j), which
covers any "method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to
protection," would apply to the test protocols or the designs for safety
and effectiveness experiments. These protocols are certainly methods
or processes and would constitute trade secrets to the extent that the
testing practices are not generally known in the industry. The fact that
certain companies are able to obtain FDA approval for new drugs
much more quickly than others indicates that innovative testing tech-
niques are of great commercial value and should qualify as trade
secrets. However, it is not clear that this protection should extend to
the scientific findings resulting from the safety and effectiveness trials.
As Theodore Cooper, then Assistant Secretary of HEW for Health,
stated to Congress:
[Safety and effectiveness data in new drug applications] should not
be regarded as trade secrets or proprietary information. The Depart-
ment believes that the concept that animal and human data on safety
and effectiveness of a drug are proprietary information belonging to
a single manufacturer should not be supported because of the enor-
mous social and economic costs of such a policy. This concept cre-
ates an impression of secrecy and generates unnecessary and
duplicative human research. Consideration of safety and effective-
ness data as trade secrets appears to serve a competitive and eco-
nomic purpose for which the patent laws are more properly intended.
We believe, therefore, that scientific data relating to safety and effec-
tiveness of a drug should be in the public domain, while, at the same
time, we continue to support the view that manufacturing methods
and processes are properly considered as trade secrets.'74
Thus, here too, the validity of the submitters' argument that the
law forbids disclosure of safety and effectiveness data is uncertain.
However, given the breadth of past constructions of section 3310) and
the apparent congressional recognition in 1962 that the confidentiality
of all trade secrets was to be protected by the FDA, this argument for
the protection of safety and effectiveness data may be successful.
172. Id. 44,634-35.
173. Id. 44,635.
174. Drug SafetyAmendments of 1976- Hearings on H.R 12391 Before the Subcomm. on Public
Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12-13 (1976), quoted in INTERIM REPORT 24-25.
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In reviewing the legal theories available to the submitters of safety
and effectiveness data, one must conclude that their arsenal against dis-
closure of the data under properly promulgated regulations is uncer-
tain. The FOIA, though not authorizing release, would not prevent it.
It is questionable whether the protection of the Trade Secrets Act
would be sufficient to prohibit disclosure under properly promulgated
regulations. Finally, it is not clear that safety and effectiveness data
would constitute a "method or process" and thus qualify as a trade
secret protected under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Therefore, if
the FDA were to conclude that release of this information would be in
the public interest and would not place undue burdens on the drug
industry, a court might very well recognize the agency's expertise and
refuse to find an abuse of discretion. The courts are generally loath to
substitute their judgment for agency expertise in this area.1 75
IV. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RELEASE OF SAFETY AND
EFFECTIVENESS DATA
Although the FDA might well be able to release safety and effec-
tiveness data submitted with new drug applications under present law,
it does not necessarily follow that such disclosure would be sound on
public policy grounds. In addition to its uncertainty as to the legality
of disclosure, the FDA has consistently refused to authorize full disclo-
sure of the data due to its belief that such a decision should be left to
Congress. 76 That question is now before Congress as part of the Drug
Regulation, Reform Bill.177 The remainder of this Comment will show
that the disclosure rules in the proposed legislation are likely to have a
substantial adverse impact on research and development of new drugs
and exacerbate the problem of drug lag, and an alternative scheme for
disclosure of the data will be presented. As a preliminary matter, how-
175. See note 108 supra and text accompanying notes 107-08 Supra.
176. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,634 (1974).
177. S. 2755 and H.R. 11611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). These bills were reintroduced in the
present Congress, S. 1045 and H.R. 4258, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). Identical versions of the
bill drafted by the Carter Administration were originally filed in each house on March 16, 1978.
The Senate bill, S. 2755, was referred to the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on
Human Resources; the House bill, H.R. 11611, was referred to the Subcommittee on Public
Health and the Environment of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The bills
were introduced by the chairmen of those subcommittees, Senator Kennedy and Representative
Rogers. The bill was drafted by the FDA after conducting extensive public hearings, and it repre-
sents an effort to enact a compromise bill. The bill contains some reforms for which industry has
lobbied heavily, such as easier and cheaper procedures to obtain a license to market new drugs.
36 CONG. Q. 689-93 (1978). Yet, the provisions in the bill allowing for the release of safety and
effectiveness data have annoyed the industry to such an extent that the president of the Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association has remarked, "If we had to say the administration bill or
none at all, we would say none." Id. 689.
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ever, a brief overview of the economics of research and development in
the drug industry will be helpful.
A. The Economics of Pharmaceutical Research.
In few other major industries is research and development as sig-
nificant as it is in the drug industry. It is important to both the individ-
ual companies and the public. The American pharmaceutical industry
is the most prolific source of new drugs in the world. Between 1963 and
1970, for example, over 80% of the new drugs introduced originated
from domestic drug research. 178 The price of that originality, however,
is high. It now costs an average of $50 million and takes eight to ten
years to develop and obtain approval to market a new drug.'
79
Studies of pharmaceutical research employ a model that divides
drug companies into two groups: research intensive and non-research
intensive.'8 0 The FDA's own study of the effect of the release of safety
and effectiveness data uses the criterion of a $10 million expenditure
for research and development in 1975 as the classifying factor.' 8 ' The
studies have also shown that a company's retail sales provide a good
indication of the amount of money a firm will spend on research and
development. It was found that research-intensive firms spend approx-
imately 8-10% of their retail sales on research and development, while
non-research-intensive firms spend only 4-5% of their retail sales in this
area.' 82 But because the research-intensive firms tend to be the larger
companies, the .difference in the amount of money spent by the two
groups is much more dramatic than the percentages might indicate.
The average research-intensive firm devoted nearly $37.5 million to
global research and development in 1975, while non-research-intensive
firms spent an average of only $2.9 million. 183 Thus, the twenty-five
research-intensive firms in the FDA study spent 93% of the research
dollar, while the twenty-four non-research-intensive firms spent only
7%. While this indicates that research and development is concentrated
in the larger companies, it does not tell the whole story. Other studies
have shown that research output, measured in terms of the "new chemi-
cal entities" (NCEs) marketed, is even more concentrated. From 1957
to 1961, the four most produtive research firms provided 46.2% of the
178. Pracon Study 14.
179. Testimony of Henry Grabowski, Professor of Economics, Duke University, Before the
Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, H.R. 11611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., June 20, 1978.
180. Both the Pracon Study and Dworkin apply this analysis.
181. Dworkin 5.
182. Id. 7; Pracon Study 61.
183. Dworkin 5.
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innovational output; for the years 1967 through 1971 that figure was
6 1%. 184 Given this concentration, it is clear that smaller companies are
finding it less productive to invest substantial sums in research and de-
velopment.
A related problem is the marked decrease in the number of new
products discovered. Despite the fact that research, in constant dollars,
grew by 56% between 1965 and 1974, the number of new products actu-
ally developed declined by 26%.185 There are several possible explana-
tions for this decline in the productivity of research. Among them are
higher costs due to increased regulation by the 1962 amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, exhaustion of profitable research oppor-
tunities, and plain bad luck. Thus, it is not surprising to note that
financial analysts have questioned the adequacy of the return on in-
vestments in drug research. 186 As one study noted, "[tlhose few firms
which continue to operate large and expensive R & D programs must
be able to demonstrate the viability of the research-intensive strategy in
an increasingly negative environment. Otherwise management will
have little alternative but to cut back on such spending in favor of more
productive investments."'' 8 7 To the extent that research output is re-
lated to research input, this would result in even fewer new drugs.
Another problem in the area of new drugs is the "drug lag." This
term refers to the interval between the time when drugs are marketed
somewhere in the world-and the time when they are marketed in the
United States. One study has noted that of all drugs available in both
the United States and the United Kingdom by 1971, two-thirds were
available first in the United Kingdom. 8 8 This delay in the introduc-
tion of new drugs has been one of the major criticisms leveled at the
FDA. It is only in the context of these problems-declining return on
investment in research and development and drug lag-that the policy
of disclosing safety and effectiveness data can be evaluated.
B. The Disclosure Policy of the Proposed Legislation.
The disclosure provisions of the proposed legislation 8 9 represent a
184. Pracon Study 32 (using data from Grabowski & Verron, Consumer Protection Regulation
in Ethical Drugs, AMER. ECON. REV. (Feb. 1977)).
185. Pracon Study 30.
186. See id. 37-42.
187. Id. 39.
188. H. GRABOwsmI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION 32 (1976) (taking data from War-
dell, Introduction of New Therapeutic Drugs in the United States and Great Britain: An Interna-
tional Comparison, 14 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 773 (1973)).
189. S. 2755 and H.R. 11611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reintroduced as S.1045 and H.R.
4258, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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marked departure from present policy. A firm seeking to market a new
drug would be required to submit three reports. 90 The first report
would contain a summary of each investigation conducted "to evaluate'
the effectiveness of the drug entity and to assess its risk," 191 and would
state the basis for the submitter's belief that the drug is safe and effec-
tive. 192 This report would be made available to the public at the begin-
ning of the FDA review process when the petition to market has been
formally filed.' 93 The second report would include a detailed descrip-
tion and the protocol for each investigation and "tables, compilations,
and analyses of all data and information. . . relevant to the evaluation
of the effectiveness of the drug entity and the assessment of its risks."' 194
This report, and the third report which would contain all data com-
piled in the testing,19 5 would be made available to the public in two
stages. When the petition is filed these reports could be disclosed to,
but not copied by, persons who seek to participate in a public hearing
on the petition so long as they are not connected with any competitor,
disavow any commercial purpose and are willing to take security pre-
cautions to assure that no competitor will gain access to the informa-
tion.19 6 These reports would be available to everyone, however, when
the petition to market the new drug is granted. 97 But, even though all
competitors would have access to the data at that point, they could not
use the data in support of their own petitions to the FDA for a period
of five years. 98
C. The Arguments in Support of the Proposals.
Advocates of release of the data have several goals in mind. First,
disclosure of the data would have the effect of opening up FDA deci-
sion making. The decisions that the agency makes regarding the mar-
keting of new drugs play a major role in the development of overall
health policy in this country, but without access to the data upon which
those decisions are based, the public cannot offer any input into those
decisions. Congress, through the FOIA and related legislation, has rec-
ognized the need for public awareness of the manner in which policy
decisions are made. Yet, because of the secrecy surrounding evalua-
190. Id. § 111(b)(1)(B).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 1I(b)(1)(B)(i).
193. Id. § 111(j)(2)(A).
194. -Ad. § llI(b)(1)(B)(ii).
195. Id. § 111(b)(1)(B)(iii).
196. Id. § 111(j)(3).
197. Id. § 111()(2)(B).
198. Id. § 121(b).
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tions of new drug applications, the FDA is able to avoid compliance
with the spirit of the legislation favoring open government. This se-
crecy is no more appropriate in scientific areas than it is in clearly polit-
ical ones: "[T]he public's need for information is especially great in the
field of science and technology, for the growth of specialized scientific
knowledge threatens to outstrip our collective ability to control its ef-
fects in our lives." 199 Opening up FDA decision making, it is sug-
gested, will lead to a more satisfactory resolution of the issues facing
the agency; the more information that is available to the public, the
greater the public's ability to hold the agency accountable for its deci-
sions. In addition, making information available to outside experts will
probably mean that the agency will have access to more evidence upon
which to base its decisions.
A second consideration is the fact that release of the data may
serve to make the agency less risk adverse. One of the major criticisms
of current FDA decision making is that the pressures on agency offi-
cials are one-sided °.2  Because the adverse consequences an official
would encounter by appproving a less than "safe" drug are so much
more severe than the problems encountered by ordering delay or fur-
ther testing, regardless of the public's need for the drug, the message to
FDA officials is crystal clear. The external pressures on officials thus
dictate risk-adverse behavior. As former FDA Commissioner Schmidt
has noted:
[I]n all of FDA's history, I am unable to find a single instance where
a Congressional committee investigated the failure of FDA to ap-
prove a new drug. But, the times when hearings have been held to
criticize our approval of new drugs have been so frequent that we
aren't able to count them .... The message of FDA staff could not
be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new drug is resolved by
its approval, the Agency and the individuals involved likely will be
investigated. Whenever such a drug is disapproved, no inquiry will
be made. The Congressional pressure for our negative action on a
new drug applications is, therefore, intense. And it seems to be in-
creasing, as everyone is becoming a self-acclaimed expert on carcino-
genesis and drug testing.201
The point is that the public might be more willing to accept some risks
in new drugs than the FDA believes. By making known its willingness
to accept certain risks when accompanied by certain possible corre-
sponding benefits, the public might be able to influence the FDA to
199. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
200. H. GRAiOWSKI, supra note 188, at 76.
201. Speech by Alexander Schmidt, "The FDA Today: Critics, Congress and Consumerism,"
National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 29, 1974), quotedin H. GRaaowsKI, supra note 188,
at 76.
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approve or at least seriously to consider drugs that it might otherwise
reject.
A third argument favoring release of safety and effectiveness data
is that it would decrease the amount of expensive, duplicative testing.
Since the data of one experimenter would be available to all once the
experimental results had been accepted, there would be no need for
others to spend the money and time required merely to duplicate the
results. The data, it is felt, is scientific knowledge that should not be
hoarded. Sharing of data as proposed in the legislation, with a five-
year ban on use of the data by another company, would protect the
primary submitter's research investment while lowering the cost of re-
search and development for everyone. This compromise thus deals
with both the rapidly rising costs of research and development and the
uncertainty of return on investment.
Fourth, the sharing of information in this protected manner would
stimulate competition in the marketing of generic drugs. Once the pat-
ent on a new drug has expired, competitors, already having access to
the requisite safety and effectiveness data, would encounter few, if any,
barriers to entry in the market for that drug. This competition would
put an effective end to the monopoly granted by the patent and would
tend to lower prices for the consuming public.
Finally, it is argued that the patent system, rather than a policy of
trade secrecy, should be relied upon to protect investments in pharma-
ceutical research and, therefore, the FDA should not interfere with that
system by superimposing on it elements of trade secrecy. While both
patent and trade secret law are designed to protect intellectual prop-
erty, one commentator has pointed out the advantages of the patent
system.20 2 Basically, patents allow for a far more efficient distribution
of scarce research resources. Because patents may be filed in the early
stages of research, the patent system puts all other researchers on notice
that another party has appropriated the area. Therefore, it is highly
unlikely that several firms will carry out substantially the same research
and spend tens of millions of dollars, only to discover that the same
data has recently been submitted to the FDA by another company.
Without the protection given by early patents, drug research would be
even more costly and the return on investment even more uncertain
than it is today.203
The patent system is also a much more reliable source of protec-
tion. A trade secret is only protected so long as it remains a secret, yet
202. See Kitch, supra note 20.
203. Id. 278.
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secrecy is often quite difficult to maintain. There is, of course, the risk
of a leak, but other problems are also present. A research institution
may find it necessary to contract with outsiders for financing or com-
plementary technology, but such contracting poses a dilemma. "Dis-
closure of the secret imperils its value, yet the outsider cannot negotiate
until he knows what the secret is." 2" Under the patent system this
problem does not arise. It is not necessary to hoard information. Since
research is spread out through early patents, there is incentive for firms
engaged in research to explore new areas rather than duplicate the
work of others.
C. The Arguments Against the Proposals.
The problem with the proposed disclosure procedure is that it does
not alleviate and, in fact, is likely to aggravate two of the major
problems facing the American pharmaceutical community-the low re-
turn on research investment and drug lag.205
The two studies sponsored by the FDA on the impact of data dis-
closure clearly indicate that the proposed policy will result in the loss of
tens of millions of dollars each year in new drug research. This loss
will occur because release of the data will allow American non-re-
search-intensive firms and foreign firms to market drugs that will divert
sales from domestic research-intensive firms.2"6 Even though these
firms could not market "follower" drugs in the United States (because
of the five-year ban on use of the data by competitors in petitions
before the FDA and because of the patent protection that most new
drugs have in this country), in those countries where drugs are not pat-
entable or are given only minimal patent protection 20 7 and where data
from foreign studies is acceptable in applications to market new
drugs,20 8 sales that would otherwise go to the original developer of the
drug are subject to appropriation by other firms. The vulnerability of
new drugs to competition created by the disclosure policy is obviously
greatest in those countries that require the submission of data but ac-
cept foreign data and do not provide full patent protection for new
drugs. This is the case, for example, in Canada, the Netherlands, Swe-
204. Id.
205. See text accompanying notes 178-88 supra.
206. Because research output is concentrated in the large, research-initiative firms, and be-
cause the amount of money devoted to research and development varies in direct proportion to
retail sales, a loss of retail sales by the large, research-initiative firms will mean that fewer re-
sources will be invested in research and development of new drugs. See text accompanying notes
178-84 supra.
207. See note 36 supra.
208. See Dworkin, Attachment B.
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den and Switzerland.2" 9 In other countries, such as West Germany,
where there is some patent protection available,21° and in nations such
as Spain, where the data requirement is not strict21' (so that the un-
availability of the data might not be a barrier to entry), disclosure of
data will have some, but less detrimental, impact.
The Dworkin study, conducted at the FDA, attempted to quantify
the loss of investment in American pharmaceutical research and devel-
opment solely on the basis of the loss of sales of research-intensive
companies. Sales can be lost to American non-research-intensive firms,
in which case the loss to American research is equal to approximately
5% of the shifted retail sales.212 Sales may also be lost to foreign com-
petitors, in which case the loss to American research is the full amount
the research-intensive firm would have committed to research and de-
velopment, about 10% of the shifted retail sales. Dworkin found that
research-intensive firms control approximately 89% of domestic sales
and non-research-intensive firms acquire an 11% share of the market
for the new drug when the patent expires. Dworkin concludes that re-
search-intensive firms will lose about $51 million a year from the shift
in domestic sales alone. In view of the fact that non-research-intensive
firms devote a lower percentage of their retail sales to research and
development, this will result in a decrease of approximately $2.8 mil-
lion in research and development.21 ,
This is, however, only the tip of the iceberg. The major loss in
research funds will come from a loss in foreign sales by American re-
search-intensive firms. By studying the level of patent protection avail-
able for new drugs, the need for safety and effectiveness data to enter
foreign markets, and the acceptability of foreign data in the nine lead-
ing foreign markets for new drugs, Dworkin calculated that one-third
of all new drug sales by American firms, or 11% of their total global
sales, are vulnerable to "follower" or generic competition. 214 Since
American firms control about 25% of world sales, 215 Dworkin assumed
that foreign firms would take 75% of the sales of vulnerable drugs.
Thus, it was calculated that $599 million per year in foreign market
new drug sales would shift to foreign firms.2"6 Non-research-intensive
American firms would also be able to enter those foreign markets. As-
209. Id. 3.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. 15-18. See text accompanying notes 180-83 supra.
213. Dworkin 15-18.
214. Dworkin 14.
215. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, 1978, at 133 (1978)).
216. Dworkin 15.
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suming that they usurp 11% of the remaining sales by American firms
in foreign markets, research-intensive firms will lose an additional $20
million annually in new drug sales.217 The loss in resources available
for all American pharmaceutical research as the result of the sales lost
to foreign companies is approximately $53.7 million a year;218 research-
intensive firms would lose $50.1 million in research funds while non-
research-intensive firms would lose the remaining $3.6 million.219 The
total projected loss to research efforts by American pharmaceutical
companies, which account for the vast majority of pharmaceutical dis-
coveries, is thus $56.5 million a year, about 4.7% of total research and
development in 1976. 220 The five-year ban on use of the data in the
United States would only affect about $2 million of that loss.2 21
The validity of the Dworkin study is not above suspicion. Some of
the assumptions that were necessary in order to estimate the impact of
the disclosure policy merit further inquiry. Dr. Dworkin assumes, for
example, that American prescription sales are an accurate sample from
which to predict the nature of world sales. Since American sales are
equally divided between new drugs22 2 and old drugs, she assumes that
world sales are also equally divided. It is necessary to estimate the per-
centage of drug sales that involve new drugs because the available sta-
tistics deal only with total sales. However, it is not clear whether the
demand for drugs in this country adequately reflects the nature of
drugs sold overseas. Dworkin also assumes stability in the market
shares controlled by research-intensive, non-research-intensive and
foreign firms without showing any historical evidence in support of this
assumption of stability. If the market share controlled by foreign com-
panies has actually increased in recent years and there is reason to sus-
pect a continuing trend, her estimates of the research loss may, in fact,
be conservative. However, sensitivity analyses indicate that varying the
assumptions regarding market shares does not change the order of
magnitude of that estimate.21 Finally, the Dworkin study does not re-
veal the extent to which foreign firms invest in new drug research. The
more they invest, the less the decrease in resources available for Ameri-
can pharmaceutical research constitutes an absolute decrease in drug
217. Id.
218. Id. 17.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. See text accompanying note 213 supra.
222. Dworkin defines a new drug as a single chemical entity or synthesis introduced in the
United States for the first time. Other products are combination drugs, duplicate products (gener-
ics) and new dosage forms. Dworkin 4.
223. Id. 17, Attachment C.
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research. Nevertheless, the Dworkin study is extremely helpful in at-
tempting to quantify the impact of disclosure of safety and effectiveness
data on research investment.
The other major problem that disclosure of safety and effective
ness data might aggravate is the drug lag. American firms will find it
economically beneficial to market their new drugs overseas before
making them available in this country. If they were to market first in
this country, the data would be released, and all firms would be able to
attack their sales in vulnerable markets. By marketing overseas first,
American companies can obtain patents in those countries where they
are available and attempt to establish a predominant market position in
the others. Thus, they can recover a substantial portion of their invest-
ment and begin to earn a profit before their sales become vulnerable.
The longer they can delay marketing their drugs in this country, the
more profitable the new drug might be. The incentive could very well
be to withhold drugs from the American market for as long as is politi-
cally and economically feasible.
This tendency will be strengthened to the extent that drug compa-
nies are wary of public unwillingness to accept the particular risks in-
herent in a new drug. Although the general public might very well be
willing to accept certain risks,224 industry fears assaults on the drug's
safety by the "Ralph Naders" of the drug world. To combat this, firms
will be tempted to market their new drugs abroad for a sufficient period
of time to accumulate additional evidence of the drug's safety and ef-
fectiveness. This will be especially true for new drugs produced by for-
eign companies. These firms are not accustomed to testing their drugs
as extensively as American firms because most countries do not require
such elaborate testing. When faced with the obligation of making their
data public if they market in the United States, many foreign firms may
decide to keep their drugs out of this country. Thus, release of safety
and effectiveness data could aggravate the drug lag by providing Amer-
ican firms with incentives to market abroad first and by inhibiting the
introduction of new drugs in the country by foreign companies.
D. An Alternative Scheme for Disclosure of the Data.
The primary goals of those seeking disclosure of safety and effec-
tiveness data-opening up FDA decision making and reducing waste-
ful duplicative testing-are important. However, the costs that would
be incurred by releasing the data under the proposed legislation are
unacceptable. Thus, it is necessary to focus on how the goals of disclo-
224. See text accompanying notes 200-01 supra.
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sure may be attained without those costs.
A three-step system of disclosure is proposed that might serve to
fill this need. First, the FDA should release detailed summaries of
safety and effectiveness data (analogous to the first report to be dis-
closed under the proposed legislation225) shortly before the agency in-
tends to hold hearings on the drug's safety and effectiveness. These
reports should be made available to anyone, including competitors. If
the FDA is seeking a meaningful contribution to the debate over
whether to allow marketing of a new drug, it should not exclude evi-
dence that could be submitted by parties having the greatest expertise
in new drug research. Competitors, by their very nature, are likely to
supply the most critical evaluations of another firm's experiments. If
the summaries are to be made available to competitors, however, it is
important that these reports not be released prematurely. Disclosure
approximately one month prior to the safety and effectiveness hearing
should be sufficient.
Second, the data would be absolutely protected from disclosure for
a specified period of time (for example, five years) after approval of the
new drug to allow the developer of the drug to reap a reasonable return
on its investment.226 After that period of complete protection, a request
for more or all of the data should be treated as a request for informa-
tion falling under exemption 4 of the FOIA. It would, therefore, be
within the discretion of the FDA to release the data. In order to do so,
however, the agency would be required to show that the benefits of
release of that particular data to that particular requester outweigh the
likely harm to the original submitter.227 If disclosure would cause sub-
stantial harm to the competitive position of the original submitter, it
would be very difficult for the FDA to justify release.228 However, the
possibility that the data could be released might speed up therapeutic
advances. If another company were on the verge of developing a
breakthrough drug and that development could be advanced by the
availability of safety and effectiveness data for a previously approved
drug, the FDA would have the authority to release that data, except
where release would cause substantial harm to the competitive position
of the first drug. It may be that such a case will arise only once every
ten or twenty years. But to deny the FDA the authority to speed up
225. See text accompanying notes 191-93 supra.
226. Under current procedure, the safety and effectiveness data in applications that are re-
jected or withdrawn is available. 21 C.F.R. § 314.14(0 (1978). See INTERIM REPORT 13-14. See
text accompanying note 38 supra.
227. See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
228. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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therapeutic advances in such a case seems inhumane.
This possibility of disclosure also creates an incentive for the origi-
nal submitter of the data to seek improvements in its drug. If the drug
is patented and the data is absolutely protected, the company holding
the patent would not appear to have any reason to improve upon the
drug. Since it has a patent for that compound, and most likely for re-
lated ones as well,229 it has no reason to invest in therapeutic improve-
ments that would be covered by the patent. The possibility of
disclosure of the data could provide the incentive necessary to en-
courage that company to explore for improvements.
Finally, after the patent life of a new drug has expired, the FDA
should not require other companies independently to develop the same
type of safety and effectiveness data. Such a requirement merely serves
to protect the original drug from competition by creating an additional
barrier to entry and requiring expensive and scientifically unnecessary
duplicative testing. This could be prevented either by releasing all of
the data after the patent life or by not requiring data from those com-
panies seeking to market exact duplicates of previously approved
drugs. The latter alternative is the more desirable. The FDA has al-
ready accepted that concept for drugs developed before 1962. Rather
than requiring a full NDA with all supporting test data, a firm seeking
to market a duplicate of a pre-1962 drug would, under proposed regu-
lations,230 only have to show the identity of the compounds in an "Ab-
breviated NDA" (ANDA). The agency is already considering
expanding this procedure to cover post-1962 drugs, and it should do so
promptly. Such a policy would encourage generic competition and
eliminate the need for wasteful duplicative testing. Since the patenting
of drugs should be encouraged,231 it would not be sound policy to af-
ford the data of unpatented drugs greater protection than that given to
patented drugs. Thus, it is suggested that ten years after approval of an
unpatented drug, its safety and effectiveness data should be released.
It is suggested that this three-part scheme for disclosure of safety
and effectiveness data satisfies, to a large extent, the goals of those who
seek full release, while minimizing the adverse impact on return on
investment in new drug research and the drug lag. This process will
open up FDA decision making by allowing access to detailed summa-
ries of safety and effectiveness data shortly before the safety and effec-
tiveness hearing. All of the data, including the protocols, is given
absolute protection for five years. This procedure for discretionary re-
229. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
230. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,126 (1978).
231. See text accompanying notes 202-04 supra.
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lease after that time could encourage development of therapeutic ad-
vances and thus lower the cost of new drug research. Expanding the
use of ANDAs in conjunction with this disclosure policy should facili-
tate market entry for generic products and thus stimulate competition.
Finally, this scheme gives an appropriate level of protection to the data
of unpatented drugs. There is no reason to suspect that the proposed
scheme would cause research-intensive companies to lose a substantial
number of sales during the first years of a new drug's marketing when
its profits must be protected. The combination of patents and the pro-
posed disclosure policy should ensure an adequate return on new drug
investment. Furthermore, given the absolute ban on disclosure for five
years and the high level of proof necessary for release during the fol-
lowing years, it is unlikely that this policy would exacerbate the drug
lag.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has surveyed both the legal and policy issues con-
cerning FDA release of safety and effectiveness data. Despite the
agency's insistence that it is unable to release the data, it appears that if
the FDA properly promulgated disclosure regulations, such disclosure
might be upheld. A change in the FDA's treatment of this data is a
major policy issue that is currently being addressed by Congress in
pending legislation. It appears, however, that the disclosure rules con-
tained in the proposed legislation would have the unacceptable effect of
decreasing research and development expenditures and aggravating the
drug lag. The Comment has presented an alternative disclosure
scheme that should fulfill the goals of those seeking full disclosure-
opening up FDA decision making and reducing wasteful duplicative
testing-without those costs.
Robert M. Halperin
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